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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 9380

vs.
LAWRENCE ALBERT HORNE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from the verdict of the jury,
in the above entitled matter finding him guilty of
the crime of rape, from the ruling of the court denying defendant's motion for a new trial, and from
the sentence of the court to the Utah State Prison.
The record on appeal is in two volumes, one
of which consists of the pleadings, minute entries
and similar papers. All references to this volume
'are designated by the letter "R." The other volume
which is separately numbered, is a transcript of
1
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the testimony and proceedings at the trial. References to this volume are designated by the letter "T."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shirley Pies, the prosecutrix, was a married
wom~an, twenty years of age, at the time of the
trial. (T. 7) Her husband, ~a member of the armed
forces, was at all times mentioned herein stationed
overseas. She lived alone with their two children in
a trailer, located in Hammond's Trailer Court, Clearfield, Utah. (T. 7, 31, 32) The defendant, twentytwo years old, resided with his parents in their home
which was but one hundred yards from the trailer
housing Mrs. Pies. ( T. 65)
The prosecutrix and the defendant had several
mutual friends, and were well acquainted with each
other, h·aving met on sundry occasions in various
bars and clubs. (T. 17, 65) He had been in her trailer on times prior to the night in question, including
the next preceding night at approxim'ately the same
hour. (T. 6'5, 71)
The prosecutrix testified that she retired about
10:30 o'clock p.m. on the night of June 14, 1960,
placing her two-year old daughter in bed with her,
and her three-year old son in another bed just off
the hallway. (T. 8) The night being warm, she left
both outside doors to the trailer open; the screen
doors were unlatched. (T. 18, 19) Shortly after
midnight she awakened when the doorbell rang. (T.
2
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8) She asked who was there, and recognized the
voice of the defendant when he replied that it was
he. (T. 9) He entered the trailer through the front
door, went into the kitchen looking for a coke, and
then into the bedroom where he found the prosecutrix still in bed, clothed only in a h·alf-slip and a
pair of pan ties. ( T. 9, 10) From this point on, the
testimony of the principals is somewh'at contradictory.
When the defendant asked the prosecutrix permission to make love to her she refused, fearing she
might become pregnant and afraid of what the defendant's girl friend would do if she learned of it.
(T. 72) The defendant maintained that upon entering the bedroom he sat down on the edge of the bed
next to the prosecutrix. (T. 66) For a time they
talked, though the conversation quickly led to necking, laughing and giggling; both were soon lying
across the bed. (T. 66, 67)
Approximately half an hour later the prosecutrix got up to go to the bathroom. (T. 11) Enroute
she passed by the open rear door of the trailer. (T.
23) While she was in the bathroom, the defendant,
undressed, smoked a cigarette, and then went to the
door of the bathroom to meet her. (T. 68) She
cl'aimed he thereupon grabbed her ·and pulled her
back to the bed; (T. 11) he said that he took her
hand; she led him. (T. 68) The prosecutrix testi3
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fied, somewhat vaguely, of a struggle which ceased
only upon her becoming "so tired," and being held
in such a manner that she could no longer prevent
the act of intercourse. (T. 11, 12) The defendant
admitted that she warned him she might become
pregnant, :and therefore took precautionary measures. (T. 70, 72) They then had intercourse, satisfying their mutual desires. (T. 69) Both principals
testified that the defendant was in the trailer for
more th·an three hours, almost all of which time was
spent in bed with the prosecutrix. ('T. 22, 70) Their
final session lasted from 1 :30 a.m. until nearly 4:00
a.m., two ~and one-half hours! (T. ·2'2)
The evidence shows that the trailers in this
park were in close proximity with each other, and
that the Newell trailer was but twenty feet from
the trailer wherein the alleged assault took place.
( T. 60) Even though the doors were open, due to
the warm night, and other trailers were close at
hand, the prosecutrix failed to make any outcry.
(T. 60)
After their love-making was over, the defendant
dressed and they went into the livingroom, smoked
a cigarette and talked for ·a few minutes; (T. 69)
after the defendant left, the prosecutrix returned
to bed. (T. 13) The defendant arose later that morning, worked all day, and went to a movie that night,
only to return home and find law enforcement of4
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ficers awaiting his arrival (T. 70) in response to
the complaint of the prosecutrix made at 7:00 p.m.
that night, (T. 30, 39) more than fifteen hours
after the alleged rape!
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION, AND THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT AND
SENTENCE ·OF THE COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT COMPETENT CORROBORATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTRIX;
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO PROVE, BEYOND
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT, THE FORCIBLE RAPE
OF THE PROSECUTRIX BY THE ACCUSED.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON THE REQUISITE EXTENT OF PENETRATION NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE IN A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE,
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED THAT AN
ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN CONSUMMATED.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE FEMALE
PERSON NEED ONLY BE SUCH AS TO MAKE NONCONSENT AND ACTUAL RESISTANCE REASONABLY MANIFEST.
POINT IV.
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK
RECITING PARTICULARS AND DETAILS OF THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE AS RELATED TO HER BY THE
PROSECUTRIX WAS HEARSAY AND INADMISSIBLE,
AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.
5
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POINT V.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT VI.
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE CUMULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN C'ONNECTION
WITH EACH OTHER RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO
THE DEFENDANT.

AR'GUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION, AND THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT AND
SENTENCE ~oF THE COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT COMPETENT CORROBORATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTRIX;
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO PROVE, BEYOND
ALL REASONABLE D·OUBT, THE FORCIBLE RAPE
OF THE PROSECUTRIX BY THE ACCUSED.

A charge of rape is one easily made but difficult to defend. Inasmuch as such an asS'ault would
rarely take place in the presence of witnesses, the
jury generally has only the testimony of the prosecutrix and the defendant upon which to base its consideration of the accusation. The appell'ate courts
have therefore closely scrutinized the testimony of
the princip·als in an effort to make certain that the
conviction is supported by evidence not incredible
or unsubstantial:
"Nevertheless, we cannot escape the responsibility of passing judgment upon whether under the evidence a jury could, in reason,
conclude that the defendant's guilt was proved
6
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beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Willia~,
111 Utah 379, 180 P. 2d 551.
"We reverse a jury verdict only where
we conclude from a consideration of all of the
evidence and the inferences therefrom viewed
in the light most favorable to such verdict
that the findings are unreasonable. In considering this question we must keep in mind
that this is a criminal prosecution, so the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding
that all reason·able doubt in favor of the defendant has been eliminated. A mere preponderance of the evidence, or a finding that
guilt is more probable than innocence, is not
sufficient." State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d
208, 357 P. 2d 183.
Where the claims of the prosecutrix are uncorrobor'ated, the survey of the appellate tribunal is even
more carefully conducted:
"While it is the law ... that a conviction
of rape may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the outraged female, it is
nevertheless equally well settled that the appellate court will closely scrutinize the testimony upon which the conviction was obtained,
and, if it appears incredible and too unsubstantial to make it the basis of a judgment, it
will reverse the judgment." State v. Goodale,
210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9.
Thus, as in the instant situation, when the prosecutrix' statements are uncorroborated, such must be
clear and convincing, 'and where they bear upon
their face inherent evidence of improbability, are
contradictory, inconsistant or unreasonable, they
7
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will be held as insufficient, and under these circumstances must be corroborated to the extent of
m·aking them sufficient. State v. Whittinghill, 109
Utah 48, 163 P. 2d 342; DeWitt v. State, 79 Okla.
Cr. 13'6, 15'2 P. 2d 284; People v. Silva, 405 Ill. 158,
89 N. E. 2d 800.
This court has gone even one step further in
holding that where the uncorroborated testimony
of the prosecutrix is improbable, contradictory, inconsistant, or unreasonable, a presumption of falsity
.
ar1ses:
" (I) f she conce'aled the injury for any
considerable length of time ·after she had opportunity to complain; if she be of evil fame,
'and stand uncorroborated by others; if she
give false and contradictory statements as to
the occurrence ; if the place where the act was
alleged to have been committed was where it
was possible she might have been heard, and
she made no outcry; if she did not show signs
of injury, but remained on friendly terms with
the 'assailant after the assault, ... these and
like circumstances carry a strong presumption that her testimony is false or feigned."
State v. Halford, 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819.
This reasoning arises mainly from the fact that
the essential guilt of the crime of rape consists, not
in the act of intercourse itself, but in the outrage
to the person 'and feeling of the female. Section
76-53-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818. Thus, unless the evidence conforms to this statutory requirement, there
8
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can be no conviction of the accused for the crime
of rape, even though an act of intercourse took place
between the principals. The existance of this element
of outrage is portrayed by the acts ·and ommissions
of the prosecutrix during ·and following the alleged
assault. It is submitted that the evidence adduced
in the instant situation demonstrated that though
the complaining witness was at first unwilling, she
consented to having intercourse with the defend!ant,
made no substantial effort to resist, and suffered
no outrage to her feelings until nearly twenty-four
hours later when she called the police and made
her complaint.
When such an outrage is committed, it is the
natural instinct of a woman's nature to promptly
m·ake the wrong known, and to seek assurance and
symp~athy and legal retribution. The prosecutrix in
this case showed no such instinct until the next
evening when she then contacted law enforcement
officers and made formal complaint. (T. 30, 39)
In Commonwe~alth v. Berklowitz, 133 Pa. S. 190, 2
A. 2d 516, five days elapsed before the prosecutrix
made official complaint, causing the court to instruct the jury to carefully scrutinize her testimony
in deciding whether she consented, because of the
lapse of time. In State v. Black, 204 So. Car. 414, 29
S. E. 2d 675, the woman wrote to her mother the
day of the assault, but failed to inform her husband
9
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or an official agency, the court therefore reversing
the conviction. In People v. Blanch, 309 Ill. 426, 141
N. E. 146, the prosecutrix failed to inform the police
for more than a month, though she told her sisterin-law the very night the assault took place. The
court held that in scrutinizing her testimony, they
were uncertain as to defendant's guilt because of
her failure to make prompt complaint, and reversed
the conviction.
Even greater aspersions are cast upon the credibility of her testimony when examining her actions
during the period of the alleged assault. She ~admitted
when going to the bathroom prior to their act of
sexual intercourse, she passed right by the open
screen door, and h·ad the opportunity to run out and
go to one of the neighboring trailers to seek aid
and assistance. (T. 23) Having no doubt by that
time ~as to what the intentions of the defendant were,
(T. 22) she failed to make any attempt to escape,
though the opportunity was there. Further, she admitted that she made no effort to turn the lights of
the bedroom on, though the switch was handy, being
just above her head, preferring to remain in the
dark with the defendant. (T. 21)
Since this was ~a warm summer night, the prosecutrix h~ad left both doors to the trailer open and
unlocked. (T. 18, 19) Because of the close proximity
of ·adjoining trailers (T. 60) had the prosecutrix
10
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made an outcry, there was a good chance that the
same would have been heard, and that help could
have been obtained. No outcry was made. She made
no attempt to wake her son, who was asleep in the
adjoining nook, (T. 2'5) nor did the sounds of the
struggle and her resistance awake him. (T. '26) Her
daughter, in bed with her, was awake earlier, but
was not bothered nor did she cry out during any of
the time in which her mother was allegedly being
violated. To the observer it is odd indeed that in
her intense objection to having intercourse with the
defendant, the prosecutrix did none of the things
normally resorted to by a female defending her
honor and virtue.
Further, her testimony was contradictory. She
said that she went to a Dr. Bitner at the Tlanner
Clinic the morning ~after the alleged assault for a
medical examination. (T. 15) On cross examination
she said the doctor she visited at the Tanner Clinic
was a Dr. Cutler. (T. 31) Whatever his name, the
doctor was not called as a witness to verify her testimony. She did not complain of any wounds, bruises
or other marks. Her physical condition seemed to
be unharmed.
Her failure to escape, the unexplained absence
of any outcry, the delay in making formal complaint,
and the lack of evidence of physical abuse, completely
alter the tenor of her story and minimize the credibility of her claim:
11
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"Unexplained f'ailure to make outcry and
delay in making complaint tend to show consent. The absence of visible injury to the prosecutrix by her alleged assailant or the spoiling
or disarray of her garments are of probative
value." Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106
N. W. 536, 7 Ann. Cas. 258. See also: Terry
v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 540, 266 S. W. 511;
Stewart v. State, 25 Ala. App. 266, 145 So.
1'62; State v. Caldwell, 212 No. Car. 484, 19'3
S. E. 716; People v. Schiro, 361 Ill. 117, 197
N. E. 535.
"Again, as bearing on the question of consent, is whether the person assaulted called for
help or made other outcry, especially where
help may reasonably be expected ... (C)onsider carefully ... the place where the alleged
assault took place, the proximity of persons
....calls for help or other outcry ... and that
she made prompt complaint to her husband
and to the police." State v. Dill, 42 Del. 533,
40 A. 2d 443.
"Upon a charge of rape, if consent appears, however reluctant it may be, there can
be no conviction, and consent may sometimes
be inferred if there has been no outcry and
no serious resistance." State v. Marable, 4
Wash. 2d 367, 103 P. 2d 1082. See also: State
v. Cobb, 359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W. 2d 745.
The conviction is even more incredible in that
she admitted being unfaithful to her husband, (T.
82, 34) and in light of testimony of her prior unchastity. (T. 57) It becomes quite evident that the
situation now under examination was nothing more
12
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than one where the prosecutrix, though at first unwilling to have intercourse with the accused because
of her fear of a pregnancy, did not resist nor object
to the act ultimately. The Wisconsin court reversed
a conviction in a parallel situation where there was
evidence of prior unchastity of the female, and where
the defendant admitted intercourse:
"The court has carefully reviewed the
record in this case and is of the opinion that
the complaining witness failed to make anything approaching the utmost resistance required by the law, and that although somewhat unwilling, she ultimately consented to
the acts in question, her unwillingness apparently being due to her fear of becoming pregnant rather than to any resentment about the
manner in which she was being treated. Although she claimed she was thrown down,
dragged and pulled under a wire fence, there
were no marks either upon her person or clothing which indicated any such treatment. Her
story is not only uncorroborated but improbable." Kaczmarzyk v. State, 228 Wis. 247, 280
N. W. 362. See also: Diavis v. State, 152 Ga.
320, 110 S.E. 18.
The friendship and intimacy of the principals
further negates the guilt of the accused. The complaining witness asserted that her reason for not
wanting the defendant in her trailer was because
of her friendship with another woman with whom
the defendant was also friendly. (T. 72) Though
she was clothed only in a half-slip and a pair of
panties, she made no effort to get out of bed, or
13
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cover up when the defendant entered her bedroom.
(T. 9) They talked for a time on the bed, and then
began to neck and make love. (T. 66) She went
to the bathroom, again without any effort to put on
proper clothing, seemingly unaware of her lack of
dress ·and completely unconcerned. (T. 2'3) Upon
her return from the bathroom, they got in bed and
spent two and one-half hours in each others arms.
(T. 22) The defendant testified of having been in
her trailer before, ·and both parties admitted prior
friendship. ( T. 17, 65) She showed a complete lack
of fear, and no serious objection. To spend two and
one-half hours in 'bed with one who has just raped
her does not seem to be natural. These factual conditions wholly square with an Illinois case wherein
the court reversed the conviction because of insufficiency of the evidence :
"She testified that he without any invitation came to her room dressed in his pajamas
and a bathrobe. He told her he was lonesome,
but that she told him she did not want to talk
with him for fear of trouble with 'another woman with whom the evidence shows defendant
was on friendly terms; that he had liquor,
which he drank, but that she refused it, as she
did not drink hard liquor; that the talked for
awhile on matters of politics and the like."
People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill. 182, 188 N.E. 375.
The conduct of both parties after the alleged
assault further distracts from the prosecutrix' claim.
The evidence shows that after they left the bedroom
1
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they went to the livingroom where they talked and
smoked a cigarette prior to defendant's leaving the
trailer. (T. 69) After he left, she returned to bed.
(T. 13) The next morning he arose at his usual
time, went to work, worked throughout the day,
went to a movie that night with a girl friend. (T.
70) He freely admitted that they had intercourse,
just as he vehemently denied that it was accomplished
with force and without her consent. These are not
the actions of a woman who has been violated, or a
man who has committed a grievous crime. State v.
C~ttrone, 8. N.J. Super. 106, 73 A. 2d 354.
The prosecutrix' description of her resistance
to the advances of the defendant is somewh~at vague,
and without detail. She summed it up as a "struggle," followed by her being "pinned" in such a manner as she was unable to move or to resist any longer.
(T. 11, 12) Her claim of resistance becomes somewhat doubtful in considering her failure to cry out
for help, or to escape when she got up off the bed
and passed by the open rear door enroute to the
bathroom, or the lack of evidence describing marks
or bruises resulting from their wrestle. Her testimony makes a feigned and passive resistance and is
insufficient to make a case of rape by force:
"The prosecutrix gives as her chief reason
for yielding to defendant that she was ~afraid
not to. At the same time, she makes it clear
that he made no threats. He gave her to under15
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stand that he was making none. She said she
did kick and holler when he pushed her against
the truck, but there is no evidence in the record of 'any struggle between them other than
this. It is clear she could have escaped from
the truck while he was walking around from
the left to the right side of it. She made no
effort to do so. There was no tearing of the
clothing nor bruises or marks of violence on
her body. There is no evidence of scratches
or bruises, or other indications of a resistance,
found on defendant. Her testimony makes a
feigned and p'assive resistance which, in the
absence of other circumstances, is insufficient to make a case of rape by force. 'Although some force be used, yet if she does not
put forth all the power of resistance which
she was capable of exerting under the circumstances it will not be rape.' " Killingsworth v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. R. 223, 226 S.W.
2d 456, citing Perez v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R.
34, 94 s.w. 1036.
In both the cited cases, convictions were reversed.
The doctrine that one m'ay be convicted of rape
on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix
is well founded. But just as well settled as the rule
itself is the exception, that where her testimony is
contradictory, uncertain or improbable, her testimony should then be corroboratedo This corroboration
should be of such dignity as to give it weight with
the jury upon the question that the actual crime
has been committed. It should not be such slight
circumstances as to leave the court 'and jury to guess
16
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o1· speculate that the crime has been committed and
that the defendant is guilty. It is apparent that the
testimony of the prosecutrix here is uncertain and
improbable, and that throughout her testimony it
is made obvious th~at her acts and failures to act
wholly contradict the legal basis for a conviction of
the defendant of the crime of rape. Her testimony
stands uncorroborated. The evidence completely fails
to sustain the conviction; the verdict of the jury
and the judgment and sentence of the court should
be set aside because of the lack of corroboration of
the prosecutrix' testimony. It has not been proven,
beyond ~an reasonable doubt, that Shirley Pies was
forcibly raped by Larry Horne.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON THE REQUISITE EXTENT OF PENETRATION NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE IN A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE,
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED THAT AN
ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN CONSUMl\IA TED.

The jury was instructed by the court that
'' (A) ny sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse as
that term is used with reference to the crime of
rape." (R. 12) The instruction was given over the
objection of counsel, (T. 85) that defendant had admitted during the course of his direct examination
that an act of sexual intercourse took place on the
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night in question between he and the prosecutrix.
(T. 69)
This court has repeatedly stated that an instruction, although it sets forth a correct legal proposition,
not based upon or applicable to the issues raised by
the pleadings and the evidence, is erroneous and
prejudicial:
"It is familiar doctrine that it is erroneous to give instructions based on a state of
facts of which there is no evidence tending
to prove, though such instructions abstractly
contain correct statements of the law." State
v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919. See
also: State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518;
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968.
In the cited case which was a prosecution for
arson, the court's instruction to the jury predicated,
in part, conviction on finding that the accused had
". . . aided, counseled, and procured said burning"
of the building, even though such a proposition was
totally unsupported by the pleadings or evidence.
The instruction was held erroneous and prejudicial,
the conviction reversed, the case remanded for a
new trial.
In the instant case the pleadings and evidence
gave rise to no issue of whether or not an act of
sexual intercourse took place. Both the prosecutrix
and the defendant admitted the same, and the jury
was under no responsibility to make any determination on this subject. The purpose of the instruction
18
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is not clear. If the instruction meant to treat it as
evidence, it violated the rule of singling out a particular piece of evidence. If the instruction aimed to
tt·eat the acts as one of the unlawful events upon
which the information was drawn, and the action
predicated, it failed because of the lack of ~any factual issue to which it pertained. In either event there
was no basis to support the court's instruction, and
the giving of such was erroneous and prejudicial to
the accused, improperly appealing to the sympathies
and prejudices of the jury. Wolf v. United States,
259 F. 388. The essential guilt of rape is not the
act of intercourse itself, but the outrage to the person
and feeling of the female. Section 76-53-17, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE FEMALE
PERSON NEED ONLY BE SUCH AS TO MAKE NONCONSENT AND ACTUAL RESISTANCE REASONABLY MANIFEST.

The jury was instructed by the court that "The
conduct of the female person need only be such as
to make non-consent and actu~al resistance reasonably manifest" in order to convict the defendant of
the crime charged. (R. 13) This instruction closely
contrasts a similar instruction given by a trial court
to a jury in a case wherein the defendant was also
charged with the crime of rape. The jury there be19
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came so confused as to the extent and meaning of
resistance that they wholly failed to comprehend
the import of the defense, and the requirements of
the law. State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d
397.
It is widely held that the State, in a prosecution for rape, must establish beyond reasonable
doubt that utmost reluctance 'and resistance on the
part of the female was exhibited. State v. Whittinghill, supra; State v. McCune, supra. The cited cases
do not stand for the proposition that the utmost resistance be shown, but utmost reluctance and resistance. Where there is no evidence of threats, it is
incumbant upon the court to instruct the jury that
the female must have been shown to have in fact
made an actual, physical, honest attempt to resist
the defendant's advances . . . efforts concomitant
with her ability and opportunities. State v. Roberts,
91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584; State v. Christensen, 73
Utah 575, 276 P. 163. The law obviously requires
more than merely demonstrating th'at her conduct
suggests she resisted in some degree. Instead it must
be shown that the woman resented the attack made
upon her in good faith and without pretense, with
an active determination to prevent the violation upon
her person:
"Although some force be used, yet if she
does not put forth all the power of resistance
which she was capable of exerting under the
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circumstances it will not be rape." Perez v.
State, supra.
In here heeding the instruction of the court, the
jury n1ay easily have returned their verdict, guilty
of rape, when in fact all that was shown to them
beyond reasonable doubt was evidence sufficient for
conviction of a battery. Kreiner v. United States, 11
F. 2d 722, cert. den. 46 S. Ct. 639, 271 U. S. 688
70 L. Ed. 1152.
POINT IV.
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK
RECITING PARTICULARS AND DETAILS OF THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE AS RELATED TO HER BY THE
PROSECUTRIX WAS HEARSAY AND INADMISSIBLE,
AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.

The State called Thelma Babcock, a close friend
of the prosecutrix, as a witness. Mter stating that
the prosecutrix had come to her trailer on the morning of June 15th, she said (T. 37):
A. When she came to my trailer, or up
to my apartment, I thought she had come up
to tell me that she was going to work, but
when I saw the expression on her face I knew
something was badly wrong, and I ~asked her,
I said: "Shirley, what is wrong?"
Q. Did she respond?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said: "Thelma, I'm in terrible
trouble." She said: "Larry Horne entered my
trailer last night, and raped me," was the
very words she said.
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It is well settled in this state that in a prosecution for rape, while it is competent to give testimony,
as an exception to the hearsay rule, that the prosecutrix complained that someone had sexual intercourse with her, forcibly 'and against her will, it
is not competent to give testimony as to the name
of the person or who it was that committed the outrage upon her:
"We believe the conversation of the prosecutrix with a friend within hours after she
had arrived home, as related by such friend,
was so lacking in details that its admission
did not violate the rule heretofore enunci'ated
by this court to the effect that where a woman
allegedly has been unlawfully violated sexually, any statement m'ade by her within a
re'asonably short time thereafter, is admissible
if, without recitation of the details, it refers
to the commission of the offense, such statement being a spontaneous utterance whose
very spontaneity together with a characteristic, natural feminine inclination to express
an outraged feeling under such circumstances,
guarantees its trustworthiness." State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P. 2d 102.
" ... (I) t is not competent to give testimony as to the name of the person or who it
was that committed the outrage upon her
. . . " State v. Christensen, supra. See also:
State v. Tellay, 100 Utah 25, 110 P. 2d 342;
State v. Neel, 21 Utah 151, 60 P. 510.
1

Counsel's failure to m'ake timely objection to
the question when propounded by the prosecutor
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at the trial is not fatal to this assignment of error,
nor does it bar the court from now considering the
effect of her reply upon the rights of the defendant.
People v. Holmes, 292 Mich. 212, 290 N.W. 384. The
prosecutor knew his witness, and well understood
what she would testify, and that her testimony could
irrevocably prejudice the defendant in that it might
be accepted by the jury to nearly the same extent
as if she were testifying as an eye-witness to the
alleged offense . . . irrevocably in that once her
testimony was before the jury the harm was done,
the error completed; motions and objections could
not then repair the injury to the defendant. Knowing this, as the prosecutor surely must have, he
framed his question in such a m'anner as to elicit
specifically the answer he got: "Larry Horne entered my trailer last night, and raped me."
This court has well stated the sober responsibility of a prosecutor:
''Both the court and the prosecutor should
be zealous in protecting the rights of an accused, and should carefully refrain from doing or saying anything from which it might
be inferred that an unfair advantage was
taken of a defendant." State v. Jameson, 103
Utah 129, 134 P. 2d 173.
It is submitted th'at this duty, incumbant upon the
prosecutor, was breached, in that he failed to make
certain that the defendant, accused of such a crime,
difficult at best to defend, was fully protected from
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conviction by any means tainted with unfairness
or prejudice.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Defendant timely 'and properly moved for a new
trial, (R. 27) which was denied by the court. (R. 29)
The grant or refusal of a new trial generally
rests in the sound discretion of the court. Such discretion, however, is not mere caprice, but the exercise of a deliberate judgment, founded on well established principles, having for its aim the promotion
of justice and the protection of the innocent. When
ruling on such a motion, it is incumbant upon the
court to m'ake its determination upon the merits of
the motion itself. State v. W ea'Ver, 78 Utah 555, 6
P. 2d 167. Such discretion has been said to be perhaps the greatest protection of the accused against
the mistakes and prejudices of the jury. State v.
Maloney, 115 La. 498, 39 So. 539. Where there is
any doubt as to the duty to grant a new trial, it
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. 23
C.J.S. 1121, § 1422. The court is referred to each
of the points hereinbefore alleged, as proper grounds
in support of the defendant's motion.
Where the prosecutor has been guilty of conduct calculated to arouse prejudice against the defendant, and to prevent him from having a fair
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trial, a conviction will be set aside and a new trial
granted. Brasher v. State, 22 Ala. App. 79, 112 So.
535; Neely v. State, 60 Okla. Cr. 99, 61 P. 2d 741;
Hager v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 9, 133 P. 263. This is
especially true where the improper conduct or the
results thereof cannot be obvi'ated by timely objection and appropriate action as is here the case.
Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 176 So. 86'2; State v.
Mcintyre, 203 Iowa 451, 212 N.W. 757.
The erroneous instructions of the court are also
grounds for a new trial, in that they misled 'and
misdirected the jury. Arnold v. United States, 94
F. 2d 499.
The motion should have been granted because
of the insufficiency of the evidence, Fuson v. Common1vealth, 230 Ky. 761, 20 S.W. 2d 742, in that the
Yerdict of the jury was clearly against the weight
of the evidence, there being reasonable doubt as to
the 'accused's guilt. People v. White, 85 Cal. App.
241, 2'59 P. 76.
The serious errors of the court and prosecutor;
the lack of substantial evidence in support of the
accusation against the defendant; the strong presumption of falsity of the prosecutrix' testimony; ...
for these reasons it is submitted that the failure
of the court to grant defendant's motion for a new
trial was an abuse of discretion and is reversible
error.
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POINT VI.
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE CUMULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN C·ONNECTION
WITH EACH OTHER RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO
THE DEFENDANT.

It is a fundamental rule that even though the
errors of the court, if they were considered to be
separate and isolated instances may not amount to
the deprivation of a fair trial, if the various errors
combine to reach that result, prejudice to the defendant may be shown. State v. Moore, 111 Utah
458, 183 P. 2d 973. This is especially so in a case
of the nature of the instant action, as the court
has recognized:
"There are some criminlal offenses that
by their inherent nature are so repulsive or
even so abhorrent to most people that the
mere accusation, unless accompanied by every
precaution of law, creates a prejudice. Rape
is among these." State v. Whittinghill, supra.
It is submitted th~at the errors of the court and
prosecutor as set forth heretofore do constitute prejudice to the defendant and did in fact deprive him
of a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the conviction of this defendant should be reversed in that the errors of thE
court and prosecutor, and the lack of sufficient evi·
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dence, resulted in a deprivation of a fair 'and impartial trial for the accused, and that the verdict
of the jury was based upon bias, passion and prejudice, and not upon the evidence adduced at the
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CRAIG T. VINCENT
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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